The Federalism Cases by Friedman, Leon
Touro Law Review 
Volume 17 
Number 1 Supreme Court and Local 
Government Law: 1999-2000 Term & New York 




The Federalism Cases 
Leon Friedman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Friedman, Leon (2016) "The Federalism Cases," Touro Law Review: Vol. 17 : No. 1 , Article 27. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/27 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
THE FEDERALISM CASES
PROFESSOR LEON FRIEDMAN1
The Constitution is an anachronism, 200 years out of date.
Although the Bill of Rights is adequate, much of the Constitution
relates to a world we no longer face. Certainly it is true that the
whole fight in adopting and ratifying the Constitution was between
the federalists and the antifederalists.2 The antifederalists did not
want a central government because a central government with a
standing army could march on the States and use their weapons to
impose all kinds of tyranny and deprive the States of their liberty.
3
The whole push and pull of the Philadelphia Convention, the
Constitution, and the ratifying conventions was to give the national
government some power, but not enough to use that power to
somehow overwhelm the States. In light of this, a national
government of linited powers was created. Congress was given
seventeen enumerated powers5 and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.6 The States wanted to give the national government only
those limited powers that a national government needs, such as, the
A.B., LL.B., Harvard University; Professor Friedman, a former Associate at
Kaye, Scholer, Fiernum, Hays and Handler, was Director of the Committee for
Public Justice and a Staff Attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union. He
has written the briefs for many important Supreme Court cases dealing with
issues of the First Amendment, abuse of government power, and criminal
procedure. He has also served as the Associate Director of the Committee on
Courtroom Conduct of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
Disorder in the Courty, which he wrote with Professor Norman Dorsen of New
York University, is considered the leading work on that subject. Professor
Friedman is the former General Counsel for Chelsea House Publishers and a
leading copyright lawyer. He is the author of law journal and newspaper articles
and a number of books, one of which, The Justices of the US. Supreme Court,
1789-1969, received the Scribes Award as the outstanding book on a legal
subject during 1970.
2 10 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES at
3 (1997).
3 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2'
4 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-17.
6 Id. at cl. 18. This provision states in pertinent part: "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id.
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power to raise an army,7 control over foreign affairs,8 and the
power to raise taxes; 9 the states wanted to take care of the rest.
Then 200 years passed and all of a sudden the national
government had control over many other things; it regulates the
environment, l it regulates economic activities,' and it
criminalizes certain activities it feels strongly about. For instance,
Congress opposes car jacking, thus, they enacted a federal law
criminalizing the act.12 Eventually, we got used to winking at the
sections of the Constitution that purported to limit national power,
particularly in the area of Congress's power to regulate. The
Constitution explicitly states that Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce'among the several States.' 3 Regulate, meaning
to pass the rules by which commerce is to be governed. It has been
interpreted very broadly indeed. 4
In Wickard v. Filburn,15 an Ohio farmer grew more wheat
than he was allotted by the government to feed his cows. 6 He was
7 Id. at cl. 12, granting Congress the power "[t]o raise and support armies .. .
Id.
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, providing in pertinent part that, "He shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties...
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . ." Id. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
1o See The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
i See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
12 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). Section 2119 states in pertinent part:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or
received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation,
or attempts to do so, shall--(1) be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious
bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 25 years, or both, and (3) if death results, be
fined under this title or imprisoned for any number or years up
to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
Id.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This provision states in pertinent part: "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ...
Id.
14 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 189-90 (1824).
1'317 U.S. 111, 115.
272 [Vol 17
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fined by the government and had to pay for the excess acreage that
he grew.17  However, if he grew only twenty bushels more in a
year than he was allotted, he would feed the excess bushels to his
own cows. How does that affect interstate commerce? According
to the Supreme Court, we must aggregate the actions of the
farmer.18 We cannot just look at poor little Filburn, we must look
at all the farmers in his position. We must aggregate all of that
activity and look at commerce as a continuous activity, the stream
of commerce. 19 By using those two tricks, stream of commerce
and aggregating activity, there isn't anything Congress cannot do
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.
The Supreme Court tried to stop Congress from
overstepping its Commerce Clause power in Carter v. Carter Coal
Company.20 The Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause power in regulating coal wages. 2 1 The Court held that coal
mining was a local activity with no effect on interstate
commerce. 22  However, two years later, Carter was implicitly
overruled.23 From 1936 to 1995, all Congressional enactments that
The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 as related to wheat is to control the volume moving in
interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses
and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high
wheat prices and obstructions to commerce. Within prescribed
limits and by prescribed standards the Secretary of Agriculture
is directed to ascertain and proclaim each year a national
acreage allotment for the next crop of wheat, which is then
apportioned to the states and their counties, and is eventually
broken up into allotments for individual farms.
Id.
'16 d. at 114-15.
'7 id.
8 d. at 128.
19 Id.
'0 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
21 Id. at 304.
22Id.
23 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act purported to "prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice," including regulation of wages and hours,
was constitutional. Id. at 30. The Court stated, "The steel industry is one of the
great basic industries of the United States, with ramifying activities affecting
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were challenged under its Commerce Clause power were held
constitutional.24  In light of this, Congress began enacting
numerous statutes testing the scope of its Commerce Clause power.
These were not very controversial laws. For instance, there was
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"). 2" The
GFSZA made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a gun
within one thousand feet of a school zone.2 6 Who doesn't want
gun-free schools? A school on Long Island in Suffolk County was
just closed because a gun was found in the school.27 In response to
the public's demands, Congress enacted this statute. Members of
Congress wanted to show their constituents that they were doing
something about this problem by responding to the public's
concerns.
However, the Supreme Court did review the
constitutionality of the GFSZA in US. v. Lopez.28 It is hard to
fault the Court's analysis of the terms of the Constitution. The
Court asked, how does carrying a gun within one thousand feet of
a school zone affect Congress? How does this affect interstate
commerce? 29  The Act contained no requirement that the gun
possessed within the school zone ever have moved in interstate
commerce.3" Although many federal statutes require that the gun
move through interstate commerce, in this case, if you did not
cross state lines with the gun, you did not violate the statute. There
was no jurisdictional hook, no requirement that the gun being
possessed in the school zone have ever moved in interstate
commerce, and the law was, therefore, declared unconstitutional.31
24 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 185-86.
2 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988). This statute forbids "any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone," Id. §§ 922
(q)(1)(A). See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (amended by 18 U.S.C.A.
6922 (q)(1)(A) (2000).Id.
27 Michael Luo, Experts: Gun in School Operable / Questions arise over
discrepancies, NEWSDAY, October 13, 2000, at A38.
28 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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After the Lopez decision, Congress revised the Act. The
GFSZA has been reenacted to include a jurisdictional element.32
Now if you go into a school zone with a gun, you will go to jail.
Why? Because five words were added to that statute. The statute
now reads that no person shall knowingly possess a gun that has
moved in interstate commerce in a place where that person
"knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."
33
Although there originally was no interstate nexus, we now have
one.
In Lopez, the Court held that Congress can regulate and
legislate only if they are controlling one or more of the following
three aspects of interstate commerce: 34 1) the use of channels of
interstate commerce, 35 2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, 36 and 3)
activities that substantially affects or relate to interstate
commerce. 37 The Court also stated that with regard to the third
aspect, the activity being regulated must be an economic activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce. 38 The Court strongly
encouraged Congress to produce factual findings to support its
conclusion that the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.3 9 The Court stated that it was no longer going to defer
to Congress in the manner they had before.4 °
Five years after the Lopez decision, the Court examined
another law enacted by Congress, the Violence Against Women
32 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (2000)).
This statute states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any individual
knowingly to possess at firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects
interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id.
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).




31 Id. at 559.
39 Id. at 562-63.
40 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (stating "some of our prior cases have taken long steps
down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad
language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion,
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Act ("VAWA"),41 which was attacked on the same basis as
Lopez.42  The VAWA is a non-controversial law containing two
parts. First, the Act contains a criminal provision which states that
if you cross state lines and beat up your spouse, or you beat her up
and then you cross state lines, or if you take her across state lines
to beat her up, you have committed a federal criminal offense.43
Second, there is also a civil provision providing the victim with
damages if she is abused. 44 However, there was no requirement
4 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). Section 13981 states in pertinent part that, "[I]t is
the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id.
42 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th
Cir. 1999).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994). The statute states in pertinent part:
A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves
Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate
that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the
course of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a
crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to such
spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Penalties.--A person who violates this section... shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned--
(1) for life or any term of years, if death of the victim results;
(2) for not more than 20 years if permanent disfigurement or
life threatening bodily injury to the victim results;
(3) for not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the
victim results or if the offender uses a dangerous weapon
during the offense;
(4) as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A
if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A
(without regard to whether the offense was committed in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or in a Federal prison); and
(5) for not more than 5 years, in any other case, or both fined
and imprisoned.
Id.
44 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). This statute states in pertinent part: "A person.
. who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender.., shall be liable to
the party injured, in an action for 'the recovery of compensatory and punitive
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that anyone had to cross state lines for this civil penalty to be
applicable. 45 There was no jurisdictional element.
After the Court's decision in Lopez, in which the Court
stated that factual findings were strongly encouraged,46 Congress
made explicit findings that domestic violence costs the United
States economy three billion dollars each year.47 Moreover,
Congress found that women who are beaten up miss work and lose
wages48 and have to go to hospitals.49 All of these things cost
money and are economic in nature, thus, Congress certainly made
findings that violence against women was a serious problem.
Congress also made a finding that the States were not doing their
jobs by treating domestic violence as a less serious crime.50 States
allowed the violence to go virtually unpunished, which encouraged
husbands or boyfriends to abuse further. In light of this, Congress
felt they needed art effective federal weapon in order to stop
violence against women.
Despite Congressional findings, when the Act was
challenged in U.S. v. Morrison,5' the Supreme Court found the law
to be unconstitutional.52 The Court stated in a very short opinion 3
that this case was governed by Lopez, and that Congress may not
regulate non-economic violent criminal conduct based solely on
41 See id. § 13981(b)-(c).
46 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
47 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2000). See S. Rep. No.
101-545, at 33 (1990).
" Id. at 1763. Congress found that, "[c]rimes of violence motivated by gender
have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential
victims from traveling interstate [and] from engaging in employment in
interstate business.... ." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
49Id . at 1762. Congress found that, "[o]ver 1 million women in the United
States seek medical assistance each year for injuries sustained [from] their
husbands or other partners." S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37.
50 Id. at 1762. Congress found that, "[a]rrest rates may be as low as I for every
100 domestic assaults." S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 38.
5 120 S. Ct. 1740.
52Id. at 1745.
53 It was a very short opinion. I was in the Court the day it was announced,
moving the admission of some of my former students. When Rehnquist started
reading the opinion, I staxted shaking my head. He stared down at me as if I was
somehow interrupting his flow; asking, in effect, why are you expressing a
negative view towards this decision? Then I saw Souter and Ginsburg with their
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that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. 54  The
Court stated that the Constitution requires a distinction between
what activity is national and what is local, and that Congress'
Commerce Clause power "[m]ay not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce . . . [that] would effectually
obliterate th[is] distinction." 55 With regard to the origins of the
Constitution, "we preserve[d] one of the few principles that ha[ve]
been consistent since the clause was adopted; that the regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence" that is not directed at the
instrumentalities or channels of goods involved in commerce has
"always been the province of the States, ' '56 or a traditional state
function. Therefore, if there is no jurisdictional hook, and you are
not controlling instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or a
person or thing that moves in interstate commerce, and you are
regulating a non-economic activity, you cannot aggregate the
activity. The Court did not disapprove of Wickard v. Filburn.
57
What are the implications of these cases? One of the
earlier cases we teach in law school is United States v. Perez.
5 8
This case involved extortionate loan transactions; 59 you lend
someone money and charge an exorbitant amount of interest, and
threaten the borrower with physical violence if the loan is not paid
back.60 The Supreme Court held that this was no problem, that
loan sharks, indeed, affect interstate commerce. 61  Oh, really?
What are they regulating in that case? Congress is not regulating
the loan, they are regulating the threat of violence if you do not
repay the loan. Here is a very well established federal statute, but
is it going to be challenged under Lopez and Morrison?
The Supreme Court has an important case this term, a case
challenging the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 62 The CWA regulates
54 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
" Id. at 1749.56 Id. at 1754.
17 Id. at 1768.
58 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
59 Id. at 147.
60 id.
61 Id.
62 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Section 1344 states in pertinent part:
Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites:
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity
278 [Vol 17
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wetlands of intrastate waters.63 The Army Corps of Engineers lay
out all kinds of regulations stating that you cannot build or fill in
wetlands without permits from them.64 What is the substantial
effect on interstate commerce of the CWA regulation of wetlands?
The water did not move in interstate commerce. The Seventh
Circuit held in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,65 that the CWA
substantially affects commerce because of migratory birds.66 The
Court stated that tourists go to see the migratory birds, and
therefore, it affects :interstate commerce.67 Here is this wonderful
wetland and I will go from Indiana to Illinois to see those
wetlands, but if the wetlands are not filled I will not cross state
lines; that is Congress's justification. Will this Act pass muster
with this new tough analysis that the Supreme Court decided in
Morrison?
Another Act that may be challenged under Morrison is the
Endangered Species Act.68 Under this Act, it is illegal to kill a red
for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Not later
than the fifteenth day after the date an applicant submits all the
information required to complete an application for a permit
under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice
required by this. subsection.
Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal sites:
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area
as a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the
use of any defined area for specification (including the
withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he
determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings,
that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds ad fishery areas (including spawning and
breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas ....
Id.
63 id.
64 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999). See 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
65 191 F.3d 845.
66 Id. at 850.
67 id.
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wolf in North Carolina because they are protected. 69 Red wolves
do not move in interstate commerce, they stay up in the Smoky
Mountains; so how are they protected by Congress? Once again,
tourists go to see red wolves.70 If the red wolves are wiped out as a
species, tourists will not go and see them.71 That, Congress says, is
how red wolves affect interstate commerce. Will this pass muster
under this new analysis? The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt,
72
actually upheld this law.73
What about the Child Support Recovery Act?74 This Act
contains a criminal provision which states that after a couple
Purposes: The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be
appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and
conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
Policy: (1) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress
that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this
chapter. (2) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress
that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local
agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with
conservation of endangered species.
Id.
69 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 2000).70 Id. at 492. The Court also reasoned that without red wolves there would be no
scientific research or commercial trade in pelts. Id.
71 id.
72 214 F.3d 483.
73 Id. at 506.
74 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994) (amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 (a)(2) (2000)).
Section 228 as enacted in 1994 stated in pertinent part:
Offense.-Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support
obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Restitution.-As used in this section-
the term "past due support obligation" means any amount-
determined under a court order or an order of an
administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due
from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of
a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and that
280 [Vol 17
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divorces and one parent moves to another state and fails to make
child support payments, suit may be brought in federal court to
enforce the support obligation.75 In United States v. Faasse,76 the
Sixth Circuit found this Act unconstitutional pursuant to Lopez and
Morrison.77  Why? The Court said that you cannot base the
decision on the basis that the parent fled the jurisdiction, because
when he fled the jurisdiction he was not behind on his support
obligation.78 Thus, it is not enough to simply say that you are in
another state, you cannot base the law merely on diversity
jurisdiction; that is not enough.
How about the Clean Air Act's effect on commerce?79 We
had smokestacks, and you have to clean the smokestacks and not
has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is
greater than $5,000 ....
Id. This statute, as amended, "includes a provision criminalizing travel in
interstate commerce with the intent to evade a support obligation." U.S. v.
Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 664 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000). See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a)(2)
(2000).
' 18 U.S.C. § 228(e). The statute states in pertinent part:
(e) Venue.--With respect to an offense under this section, an
action may be inquired of and prosecuted in a district court of
the United Slates for--
(1) the district in which the child who is the subject of the
support obligation involved resided during a period during
which a person described in subsection (a) (referred to in this
subsection as an "obliger") failed to meet that support
obligation;
(2) the district in which the obliger resided during a period
described in paragraph (1); or any other district with
jurisdiction otherwise provided for by law.
Id.
76 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000).
77 Id. at 663.
78 Id. at 672.
79 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-26. Section 7401 states in pertinent part:
b) Declaration. The purposes of this subchapter are--(1) to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources
so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population; (2) to initiate and
accelerate a national research and development program to
achieve the prevention and control of air pollution; (3) to
provide technical and financial assistance to State and local
governments in connection with the development and
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have carbon particles or sulfur particles. 80 Now what is the effect
on commerce to say you've got to have one of these? But particles
aren't moving in interstate commerce, they are not items of
commerce. 81 What is the economic effect? I think all of these
environmental laws are maybe most susceptible to attack on this
basis because our justification for upholding these environmental
laws over a long period of time has been a very attenuated notion
about effect on commerce. 82 However, if Congress made findings
that the Court found sufficient, we are not going to look any
further. Now the Supreme Court says that if it is a non-economic
activity you've got to look.83 There must be a substantial effect on
programs; and (4) to encourage and assist the development
and operation of regional air pollution prevention and control
programs.
Pollution prevention. A primary goal of this chapter is to
encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and
local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of
this chapter, for pollution prevention.
Id. at § 7401.
80 Id.
81 To establish jurisdiction, the statute, 42 U.S.C. 7401(a)(1), states, "The
Congress finds (1) that the predominant part of the Nation's population is
located in its rapidly expanding metropolitan and other urban areas, which
generally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions 'and often extend into
two or more States." Id.
82 In United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), the Supreme Court
stated:
The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-
for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime
(the suppression of which has always been the prime object of
the States' police power) to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce. If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would
allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.
Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence,
it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of
violence since gender- motivated violence, as a subset of all
violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than
the larger class of which it is a part.
Id. at 1752-53.
83 In Morrison, the Supreme Court explained the rationale for creating a
distinction between economic and noneconomic activities, "While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
12
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a true commercial activity and we are not simply going to accept
Congress's say-so with regard to this.
8 4
There are all kinds of criminal laws: car-jacking laws, 5
violent crime in aid of racketeering laws,
8 6 gun possession laws,8 7
one law after another with a very attenuated interstate connection.
Timothy McVeigh was prosecuted for possessing a weapon of
mass destruction following the Oklahoma City bombing.8 8 There
was no requirement that the weapon move in interstate commerce,
he merely had to possess a weapon of mass destruction. 9 Simple
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature." Id.
84 The Morrison court explained this point further:
The fact that the Act does not pass muster before the Court
today is therefore proof, to a degree that Lopez was not, that
the Court's nominal adherence to the substantial effects test is
merely that. Although a new jurisprudence has not emerged
with any distinctness, it is clear that some congressional
conclusions about obviously substantial, cumulative effects on
commerce are being assigned lesser values than the once-
stable doctrine would assign them. These devaluations are
accomplished not by any express repudiation of the substantial
effects test or its application through the aggregation of
individual conduct, but by supplanting rational basis scrutiny
with a new criterion of review.
Id. at 1764.
85 Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2111 et seq. (1996).
86 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et.seq.
(1984).
87 Gun Control Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C. §5801 et. seq. (1968)
"United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998). The statute under
which McVeigh was convicted was the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996. See 18 U.S.C. §2332a. (2000).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (a) states in pertinent part: "A person who, without lawful
authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass
destruction .... ." Id.
18 U.S.C. §2332a (c) (2) states:
[T]he term "'weapon of mass destruction" means-- (A) any
destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title; (B)
any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or
impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;
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possession of a weapon of mass destruction is a federal crime;
there is no requirement that the assault weapon move in interstate
commerce. 90  The argument would be that if an individual
dynamites a building, or uses an assault weapon, that act is likely
to have an effect on interstate commerce. However, the Supreme
Court now says that you are required to justify each law by proving
its effect on commerce in each case. Thus, fifty years of
congressional enactments are based on Congressional findings that
there is an effect on commerce, which up until now have not been
challenged in the courts.91 Now we are going to have to take
another look at these.
Secondly, last year the Eleventh Amendment was
discussed.92 I give you statistics each year on how many laws have
been declared unconstitutional. Since Marbury v. Madison,93 over
a 197 year span, 154 laws have been declared unconstitutional.94
Yet, in the last five years the Supreme Court has declared twenty-
five laws unconstitutional.95 Thus, instead of an average of less
than one a year they are now declaring four or five laws
unconstitutional a year. Moreover, of the twenty-five laws that
have been declared unconstitutional in the last five years, eleven of
them are on federalism grounds and the biggest one being the
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states that
federal judicial power shall not extend to suit by a citizen of a state
against another state. 96  However, there is no mention about a
citizen's suit against his own state.97 Hans v. Louisiana, discussed
weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at
a level dangerous to human life.
Id.
9 Id.
91 N.L.R.B. v. Jones, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), is considered the first case in a line of
cases that upheld Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
9' 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
94 Leon Friedman, New York State Constitutional Laws: Trends and
Developments, 16 TOURO L. REv. 265 (2000).
9' Id., at 93.
96 See supra note 92.
97 See supra note 92.
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the history regarding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
98
There was a time about ten or fifteen years ago when Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun wanted to overrule
Hans v. Louisiana; that time has passed. Instead of the Eleventh
Amendment fading out of the picture, it has become very strong.
Briefly, the history is as follows: in a case called
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Supreme Court held that Congress
can overrule the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by use of
its Commerce Clause power. 99 Then in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,00 the Supreme Court decided to overrule Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas,10 1 holding that Congress may overrule a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, but only if it is exercising its
power relying on a later constitutional provision such as the
" 134 U.S. 1 (1890),(holding that a State cannot, without its consent, be sued in
a Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens, upon a suggestion
that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States). In Hans, a brief history was given for the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment:
[U]nder the language of the Constitution and of the judiciary
act of 1789, a State was liable to be sued by a citizen of
another State, or of a foreign country. That decision was made
in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, and created such a shock
of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of
Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in
due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.
Id. at 11.
99 491 U.S. 1 (1989). "We hold that CERCLA renders States liable in money
damages in federal court, and that Congress has the authority to render them so
liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause." Id. at 23.
'00 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
101 517 U.S. at 76:
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making
the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal court. The
narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment provided by the
Ex parte Young doctrine cannot be used to enforce (the
statute) because Congress enacted a remedial scheme . . .
specifically designed for the enforcement of that right. The
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Fourteenth Amendment. 10 2 Therefore, if Congress is relying on its
powers flowing from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress shall have the power to enforce these provisions by
appropriate legislation. 10 3  The laws that Congress passes under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can overrule a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.1
0 4
102 Id. at 184-85. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In this
case, the Supreme Court most clearly enunciated this concept. When deciding
whether or not Congress exceeded its Section 5 powers when enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Supreme Court stated:
Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to
"enforc[ing]" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has described this power as "remedial," . . . . The
design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing
what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing
would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions
of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."
Id. at 519.
103 Id.
104 Seminole, 317 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court in Seminole, explained
Congress's Section 5 powers:
Thus our inquiry into whether Congress has the power to
abrogate unilaterally the States' immunity from suit is
narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting
Congress the power to abrogate? Previously, in conducting
that inquiry, we have found authority to abrogate under only
two provisions of the Constitution. In Fitzpatrick, we
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding
federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had
fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power
struck by the Constitution. We noted that § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the
States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." We held that
through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended
to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and
16
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Very early in the game, after Title VII was extended to
state and local officers in 1972,105 and state and local employees,
the Supreme Court, in a case called Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,1°6 held
that Title VII was a valid exercise of congressional power under
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore States can be sued for
gender and race discrimination. 107 Then two years ago, the
Supreme Court had a line of cases dealing with the Eleventh
108 109Amendment. There was a patent case, a trademark case,' and
a copyright case-10 and they established a new rule which was to
forget the Necessary and Proper Clause. If you overrule a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity or if you purport to overrule a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, you must show that there
is a problem. Furthermore, it must be a problem that the states are
uniquely creating, it must be a pervasive problem, and it must be a
problem that we have already recognized as constitutionally
important and constitutionally protected.
therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed
Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by
that Amendment.
Id.
105 Civil Rights Acts of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq. (2000) (as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.
2000(a)). The statute was amended in 1972 to include "governments,
fovemmental agencies, and political subdivisions." Id.
427 U.S. 445 (19,76). "As relevant here, the definition of 'person' . . . was
amended by § 2 (1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ... to
include 'governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions.' Id.
at n.2.
o7 Id. at 457. The Court stated, "[g]iven the express congressional authority for
such an award in a case brought under Title VII, it follows necessarily from our
holding ... that Congress' exercise of power in this respect is also not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. We therefore affrn the Court of Appeals' judgment.
. on this basis." Id.
108 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding the Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained as a
valid congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
109 College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (holding the Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained as a
valid congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Let me explain that. The Fourteenth Amendment states,
"Nor shall any state deprive any person equal protection of the
law.""' The Supreme Court has declared that race and gender
discrimination are constitutionally protected by the Equal
Protection Clause.' 12 In that case, Congress can afford a remedy,
which is granted pursuant to its Section 5 power.1 13  In other
words, the Supreme Court has to define the constitutional
violation. Only after the constitutional violation has been defined
can Congress pass a proportionate and congruent remedy. 14 When
Title VII came up before the Supreme Court we did not have this
test.
Recently; commencing about two years ago, the Supreme
Court began to examine various laws dealing with employment
discrimination.'l 5  Just last year, they dealt with age
discrimination. 1 6 Now, Congress extended the age discrimination
law, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, to the States very
explicitly." 17  In the same way they extended Title VII to the
111 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
112 See Brown v. Board. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that
"segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely
on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such
segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Craig v. Boren 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (holding that the "gender-based differential under state statutes
prohibiting the sale of ... beer to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18 constitutes a denial to males 18-20 years of age of equal
rotection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 states: "The Congess shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
114 Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that, "in determining whether, for
purposes of Congress' enforcement power under § 5 of the Federal
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, federal legislation is permissibly
remedial or impermissibly substantive, there must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end").
115 In addition to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, it also reviewed
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in Universit, of Alabama at
Birmingham v. Garrett, 193 F.3d 1214 (1 lth Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
1669 (2000).
116 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (determining that the
ADEA contained clear statement of intent to abrogate States' sovereign
immunity, but the ADEA's purported abrogation of immunity was invalid).
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
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States, Congress has extended the age discrimination law. The
problem with the age discrimination law was that the Supreme
Court had never said that age was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 118  Therefore, the question is, can Congress,
through enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect an
interest that the Supreme Court had not decided was
constitutionally protected? In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
another five-to-fbur decision, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not do so.119 Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion,
concluding that the ADEA was not appropriate legislation under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12  The age classification
at issue did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, according to
the Kimel court. The court opined that age classification cannot be
characterized as irrelevant to the achievement of a state interest
because older persons, unlike those who suffer discrimination on
the basis of gender, have not been subject to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment.'
2'
How can the Court hold that "[o]ld age.., does not define
a discrete and insular minority"? 122 "Judged against the backdrop
of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is
so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive objective
that it cannot be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent
unconstitutional behavior."' 123 There is very offensive language in
118 See, e.g., Gregoxy v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470. Age is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
"1 Kiinel, 120 S. Ct. at 646:
States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending
the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The
rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does
not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate
interests they serve with razorlike precision.
Id.
120 Id. at 645.
121 Id.
122 id.
123 Kitnel, 120 S. Ct. at 647 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 29 U.S.C. § 621
(b) states: "It is therefore the purpose of this Act... to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
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the Supreme Court decision which states that Congress failed to
identify a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the states. 124
It is not enough to say that there is age discrimination in
employment generally, you must show that there is a particular
problem in the states doing it. Moreover, it is not enough to say
that in some states, it has to be a pervasive problem. Listen to
what the Court is saying: since Congress failed to identify a
widespread pattern of age discrimination by the states, the ADEA
law is unconstitutional. 25
This year, the Supreme Court is going to look at the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 126 Employers certainly
were discriminating in general against people with disabilities.
However, were the states a particular source of the problem and
was it widespread in the states? The case before the Supreme
Court is University of Alabama at Birmingham v. Garrett.2 The
Eleventh Circuit upheld the ADA, finding sufficient findings that
the states and governments were particularly unsympathetic to
people with disabilities. 28 However, the Seventh Circuit found the
ADA unconstitutional. 129  The Sixth Circuit also said it is
unconstitutional, and the Eighth Circuit agreed.1 30 This year we
will see how the Supreme Court handles this issue.
124 Kimnel, 120 S. Ct. at 649.
125 Id. at 649-50.
126 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2000).
127 193 F.3d. 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
128 Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1218.
129 Stevens v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 210 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that "Congress' abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
ADA was without authority under the § 5 of the 14th Amendment because
Congress made no findings of discriminatory conduct by the States that violated
the 14th Amendment, which would authorize Congress under § 5 to remedy
those violations").
130 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627 (6th
Cir. 2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its enforcement authority under the
14th Amendment in applying Title II of the ADA to the states because Title II of
the ADA's strict prohibition on discrimination, along with the accommodation
requirement, regulated far more conduct than 14th Amendment § 1, the Equal
Protection Clause, prohibited. Because evidence was scarce that the states
unconstitutionally discriminated in the provision of public services to the
disabled, Title II of the ADA was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding that extension of the ADA to the states was not a proper exercise
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How about the Family Medical Leave Act?"' This is a
very important federal law that allows people, if there is a family
member sick or someone is pregnant, to take leave from the
workplace.' 3 2  It applies to the federal government, to local
governments, and it applies to federal employees.' 33 The question
is, does it apply to the states? There are four million people
working for the states. That is three percent of the entire work
force, and they are probably not protected by the ADA, or the
Family Medical Leave Act. Four million people without that kind
of protection, and where does all this come from? It comes from
exactly this kind of analysis: look at the Constitution closely, we
of Congress's power under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. Consequently, there was
no valid abrogation of Arkansas's immunity from private suit under the 11 th
Amendment, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA
claim).
131 Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
132 See Id. 29 U.S.C. §2601(b) states:
It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs
of families, to promote the stability and economic security
of families, and to promote national interests in
preserving family integrity;
(2) to entitle: employees to take reasonable leave for medical
reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the
care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health
condition;
(3) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1)
and (2) in a manner that accommodates the legitimate
interests of employers;
(4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1)
and (2) in a manner that, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [USCS,
Constitution, Amendment 14, § 1] minimizes the potential
for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by
ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible
medical reasons (including maternity-related disability)
and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral
basis; and
(5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for
women and men, pursuant to such clause.
Id.
... 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (4) (a) (iii). This subsection states in pertinent part: "The
term "employer" inckdes any "public agency", as defimed in section 3(x) of the
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want a national government with limited powers.1 34  The states
retain these powers, and we cannot let the states be subject to
suit. 3 5 Now, one way out of this is that the states are not acting as
states, they are acting as employers and the governments are not
exercising their governmental capacity. All of these laws pertain
to their proprietary functions as employers. However, the Supreme
Court has not made that distinction for a very long time.
Let me just add two things. There were three additional
federalism laws last year before the Supreme Court. The Court
actually rejected a Tenth Amendment federalism argument, in
Reno v. Condon.136  The case involved the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act ("DPPA") in which Congress had passed a law
prohibiting the states from selling motor vehicle information.
137
The facts are as follows: an individual in California who was
stalking an actress wanted to find her address. 13 8 He went to a
commercial outfit that put all this information on their websites.'
39
There was motor vehicle information that the state of California
1
34 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2.
135 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
136 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
137 Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000). 18
U.S.C. § 2721 (a) states in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subsection (b),
a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor,
thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person
or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department
in connection with a motor vehicle record." Id.
138 Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal Driver's
Privacy Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudence of
Process-Oriented Federalism Under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 71, 88 (1998). In this article, the authors explained the genesis of the
DPPA:
Congress enacted the DPPA primarily as an anti-stalking
measure after the highly-publicized stalking death of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer on July 18, 1989. Prosecutors successfully
alleged that Robert John Bardo was an obsessed fan who had
"stalked" and fatally shot Schaeffer after obtaining her address
and other personal information from a private detective. The
private detective agency, reportedly obtained the information
from Schaeffer's motor vehicle records.
Id.
139 Odom & Feder, supra note 138.
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had sold to this commercial outfit. 140 The stalker was able to find
the actress's address, and he proceeded to stalk and kill her.'
4 '
Congress felt that something should be done about this, thus, they
passed the DPPA.142 In the state of South Carolina, the Fourth
Circuit found that it was a Tenth Amendment violation because
Congress was making the states carry out a federal function.
1 43
The case goes to Supreme Court and it is a nine-nothing decision
delivered by Rehnquist. 144 Rehnquist stated that Congress is not
enlisting the states to carry out a federal policy, instead, it is
prohibiting the states from carrying out a policy that it does not
agree with.145 Upon this distinction, the Supreme Court upheld the
law.
Two other cases also challenged the federalism issue. One
was Jones v. United States, which dealt with the Federal Arson
Statute. 146 The Federal Arson Statute makes it a crime to bum
down any building used in commerce. 147 However, what happens
140 Odom & Feder, stipra note 138.
141 Odom & Feder, stipra note 138.
142 See supra note 13.7 and accompanying text; Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court ruling that held that the DPPA
violated the Tenth Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement in the
state of South Carolina).
143 Condon, 155 F.3d at 463.
144 Condon, 120 S. C1. 666 (2000).
145 Id. at 672:
[T]he DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign
capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates
the States as the owners of databases. It does not require the
South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations [as
in New York], and it does not require state officials to assist in
the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals las in Printz]. We accordingly conclude that the
DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles
enunciated i New York and Printz.
Id.
146 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000) (holding that the arson of owner-occupied residence
not currently used for any commercial purpose held not to be subject to
prosecution under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. 844 (i), because residence
was not "used" in commerce or commerce-affecting activity).
147 18 U.S.C. 844 (i) (2000). This statute states in pertinent part: "Whoever
maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of
fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
23
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if you bum down a private dwelling? Is the private dwelling used
in commerce? Well, the wood that made up the private dwelling
was used in commerce, in fact, we know that all the building
products were used in commerce. Thus, an argument was made
based on Lopez and Morrison.148 However, the Supreme Court
stated they were going to narrowly interpret the law as not
covering private residences, and therefore we do not have to pass
on the constitutionality of the law.14 9 If the Court had considered
the constitutionality, it probably would have struck the law down
because the activity regulated is the burning down of a building,
which is a non-economic activity.
The last case which again raised a constitutional issue, but
then escaped from it, is a qui tam case, Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States,15 0 in which a suit was brought under
the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act states that anyone
who brings an action against a person who engages in fraud, may
do so in federal court. 1 5 1 Additionally, the action is, theoretically,
brought by the United States, but it is always on behalf of the
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce shall be imprisoned... fmed... or both." Id.
148 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 1910:
The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana residence
into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was constantly
"used" in at least three "activities affecting commerce." First,
the homeowner "used" the dwelling as collateral to obtain and
secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender; the lender, in
turn, "used" the property as security for the home loan.
Second, the homeowner "used" the residence to obtain a
casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer. That
policy, the Government points out, safeguarded the interests of
the homeowner and the mortgagee. Third, the homeowner




150 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 1858 (2000) (holding that although relator had standing to bring qui tam
action against state agency under the False Claims Act, state agency was not
subject to liability in the action).
151 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
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person who blows the whistle against the defendant. 152 Moreover,
Vermont raised the Eleventh Amendment defense, stating that the
state could not be sued. 153 In reality, it is not the United States
who is the party whose standing is examined (in terms of who can
sue the states), it is really a private individual because they are the
ones who get the economic benefit.1 54  However, the Supreme
Court stated that in. interpreting the qui tam statute, we look to the
person, not a state. 15  The Court did not find the law
unconstitutional, it simply interpreted the operative language in a
way that states could not be sued.
156
There are two more cases this term where the Supreme
Court will have to look at the ADA 157 and the Clean Water Act.' 58
The federal courts are coming right up behind examining all of
these issues. So this issue is not going away.
152 Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1860. "As amended, the FCA imposes civil
liability upon 'any person' who, inter alia, 'knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government... a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval."' Id.153 Id. at 1866.
154 Id. at 1863:
We believe, however, that adequate basis for the relator's suit
for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee
of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by
the assignor .... We conclude, therefore, that the United
States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing on respondent
Stevens.
Id.155 Id.
156 Id. at 1871. "We hold that a private individual has standing to bring suit in
federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act... but
that the False Claims Act does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in
such actions." Id.
157 University of Alabama v. Garrett, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
8 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
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